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US-CARICOM TRADE, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO BARBADOS
R. Orlando Marville*
INTRODUCTION
For the purposes of this paper, CARICOM is taken to mean those
English-speaking states which lie in an area which moves southeastward
from Jamaica in the Greater Antilles to Guyana on the South American
mainland. The Bahamas and Belize, in spite of their connections with the
* Counselor, Mission of Barbados to the United Nations.
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Community,' are not strictly included in this generalized commentary.
The statistical evidence on which I have drawn has, by and large, been
limited to the period 1973-76, which adequately highlights some of the
problems involved in the trade as seen from a community, or more
specifically, a Barbadian viewpoint.
The choice of years does not have any magic of its own except that it
is the period when oil became king; if we examine this period and the
years following, a commentary on US-CARICOM trade will flow more
easily.2 Barbados was chosen as the point of emphasis, not because it is
an absolutely typical representation of the trade,3 but since it possesses
many varying characteristics common to different states within the
region. Although it possesses very little of the mineral resources of the
larger states - Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago - and thus
being, in terms of natural resources, more like the agriculturally-oriented
states of the region, Barbados has a fragile industrial base similar to that
of the above three larger states.
Finally, I will not attempt a detailed analysis of the movement
(growth or otherwise) of US-CARICOM trade in the most recent past, but
will attempt to highlight some of the problems and issues involved in the
trade. Hopefully, these observations will point the way to possible in
depth areas of study as well as identify some of the problems of the
Caribbean - an area to which many a U.S. leader has referred in global
policy speeches and about which the present U.S. Administration utters
some expressions of concern.
BASIC PATTERNS OF TRADE
In 1973, all of the smaller island states of the Eastern Caribbean,4
including Barbados, conducted more trade with the United Kingdom than
with the United States. Essentially, the colonial pattern of trade had
persisted, and with the colonially-instituted Eastern Caribbean dollar in
1. The countries are - in addition to Barbados and starting in the Western
Caribbean - Jamaica, Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, St.
Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. CARICOM
includes Belize as a full member, while the Bahamas participates only in the
Community. There are, however, certain basic features in the trade between these
two states and the U.S. which would merit a separate study.
2. US-Caribbean trade dates back to the days of slavery, molasses, sugar and
rum in the early and middle seventeenth century.
3. Indeed, it is difficult to speak of any single CARICOM state as typical,
since there are significant variations in the products, productive capacity and
needs of the various units of the Community.
4. Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent.
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use by these states and by Trinidad and Tobago, trade patterns with the
United Kingdom had been maintained as before. (This was entrenched by
the fact that the dollar was tied to the pound sterling.) In 1973 Trinidad
and Tobago's greater U.S. trade was due largely to that country's oil sales
to the U.S. market. By 1976, the picture had altered considerably. Oil
prices had increased and Trinidad and Tobago's trade with the U.S.
accounted for nearly forty-five percent of its total trade volume; Guyana's
volume of trade with the U.S. had declined, but the U.S. still remained its
most significant trading partner, while Jamaica's trade with the U.S. had
increased nearly thirty percent in dollar value, and Barbados' trade
volume in dollars had increased nearly ninety percent. If we include the
Bahamas and Belize, whose major trading partner had traditionally been
the U.S., the United States had become the largest trading partner of the
Community.
Interestingly, US-CARICOM trade (excluding the Bahamas and
Belize) shows a deficit for the United States, yet the statistics mask some
important facts. Only Trinidad and Tobago has a favorable balance of
trade with the U.S., largely due to the elastic U.S. need for energy. The
deficit shown in the trade figures of the other Community countries is on
the increase, and this is a fact which is a significant indication of the
nature of the region's trade. In 1974, Guyana showed a small surplus of
exports over imports in its trade with the U.S. By early 1976 Guyana was
importing more than it was exporting to that country; Barbados had
made a dent in the imbalance, but the import/export ratio was still
somewhat greater than 2:1. Jamaica's position was similar to Barbados',
if less severe in percentage terms. To add one more statistic for Barbados,
that country had a visible trade deficit of BDS$225 million in 1973; in
1977 the figure had risen to BDS$360 million, a figure which exceeded the
total import figure for 1973.5
One other area masked by the U.S. deficit is the nature of the trade.
Apart from petroleum, the most significant U.S. mineral import from the
Community is bauxite. However, the International Bauxite Association
has not managed to bring the needed element of stability to bauxite
prices. Thus with market fluctuations in this commodity, Guyana and
Jamaica must at times have felt that they suffered the problems of two
sugar industries at one time.
Other items of trade from the Community to the United States are
largely primary products, not atypical of the traditional South-North
5. The figures are taken from a statement made by the Governor of the
Barbados Central Bank to the Barbados Manufacturers Association in March
1978.
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export pattern. Some of the major items are sugar, rum, agricultural
produce, oils, spices, coffee and crustaceans. Some clothing and cigars
also reach the market. Flowing in the opposite direction is a line of
manufactured goods which ranges from pots and pans to industrial
machinery needed in mining, as well as food products which have become
a traditional part of the Caribbean diet.
BARBADOS
Vast problems have beset industry in the Community. Traditionally,
as Dr. Courtnay Blackman has recently indicated,6 not enough local
investment has been made in industry. The comfortable and well-
established colonial tradition of setting up an import agency which
registered its profits as the demand for the foreign product grew, took
little notice of the question of balance of payments. Thus, in Barbados, for
example, of a reported BDS$17 million investment in industry in 1977,
only $500,000 came from Barbadian investors, with a near automatic
guarantee of a large outflow of profits and dividends in the immediate
future.
To be fair to the would-be industrialists, the colonial past did not
present too many incentives to the development of industry. In colonial
society it made more political sense to provide industrial jobs for the
members of one's immediate political environs than to create semi-
independent economies. Only after several years of independence did
agencies like the Jamaican National Export Corporation, the Barbados
Export Promotion Agency and similar agencies in Guyana, Trinidad and
Tobago, St. Vincent and St. Kitts become established. These were
followed by the region's various export credit schemes.
Financing and incentives apart, Barbados, like the other members of
CARICOM, has tended to lack the sophistication required to make a
significant impact on the U.S. market. Unfamiliar with the volume and
timing required by such markets, new local industrialists have not
always appreciated the need for market expertise. Even when they have,
it has been difficult for them to secure the funds required for financing
promotion campaigns from Barbados-based commercial banks which
have conservative lending policies regarding local industry. Thus
Barbadians and other Community clothing producers have been unable
to compete successfully with the clothiers of South Korea and Taiwan on
the U.S. market, and most of the earnings from the export of CARICOM-
made clothing has accrued, in Barbados for instance, to transnational
clothing corporations based there.
6. Governor of the Barbados Central Bank. Id.
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In addition, internal market problems with CARICOM since 1976
have tended to increase the frustration of industrialists trying to build a
base from which they could move on to the larger U.S. market. Operating
on the basis that the CARICOM market was an initial stepping-stone to
greater markets, many new industrialists found that the balance of
payments problems experienced in states such as Guyana and Jamaica
destroyed both their fledgling CARICOM markets as well as their
prospects for further development.
THE U.S. ROLE IN BARBADOS AND CARICOM
EXPORT TRADE
The U.S. role in the negative factors affecting the development of
export trade within CARICOM cannot easily be overlooked. The classic
case is rum, identified in the TSUS under Heading 168.40. The duty
attracted by foreign rums (meaning essentially non-Puerto Rican rums) is
$1.75 per proof gallon. A look at a few other spirituous beverages in the
168 listing provides an interesting comparison.
Item Duty (per gallon)
TSUS 168.18 Brandy valued under $9 per proof gallon 621
TSUS 168.35 Gin 50c
TSUS 168.45 Whiskey (Irish and Scotch) 51¢
TSUS 168.46 Other Whiskey (competition for U.S.-
made Bourbon?) 62c
Barbadian rum producers would be happy to reach the U.S. market in at
least some reasonable volume; but they argue that the $1.75 per gallon
imposed on their product effectively prices it out of the range of the
drinking public. They also argue that with the small profit margins under
which they must now operate, they could not possibly afford the
advertising and other promotion costs which would be required to make
the quality of their product known. In fact, in an effort to cut its costs, a
Barbadian company has shipped considerable quantities of its U.S. sales
in bulk, thus diminishing the total local value of the product.
The U.S. argument that it is necessary to protect the Puerto Rican
rum industry is understood. However, it is felt that the tariff imposed is a
matter of overkill, and that in fact CARICOM would cut into the sales of
whiskey and gin rather than those of the well-promoted Puerto Rican
brands. CARICOM producers also do not think that they would produce
enough rum to hurt the present Puerto Rican sales, even if they did
compete with Puerto Rican rums. In fact, although they would be
prepared to accept a tariff pitched somewhere in the region of that of gin,
brandy or whiskey, which would make them competitive with these
products, they feel discriminated against when the tariff on rum is
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pitched at a level considerably higher than any other original beverage.
Another irritant to the Community exports to the United States came
in the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 and the accompanying GSP. When the
Trade Act was passed, there was a good deal of optimism among
CARICOM producers who hoped for a system of preferences as liberal as
the EEC's special-tariff treatment of products from the African,
Caribbean and Pacific states under the Lom6 Convention of 1974. It was
found that in spite of Caribbean proximity to the U.S., it was easier to
export to the EEC. The Lom6 Convention, clothiers observed, made
special provision for CARICOM industries using EEC-originating
textiles, while no such provision was made in the U.S. GSP when U.S.
textiles were used.
Since 1976 a number of the restrictions in the Trade Act have become
evident. Jamaica and Guyana supplied the United States with sugar
when that commodity was scarce on the residual world market. They
later found that the competitive need criteria had worked against them
and that, not only was their sugar subjected to a tariff which increased
threefold in late 1976, there was no automatic restoration to preferential
treatment when their quotas had been appropriately readjusted. Even
with other products like wrought halfnium from Barbados or aromatic
bitters from Trinidad and Tobago, it was possible to see one's duty-free
status evaporate by being the major or sole producer of the product. The
possibility of there being further unforeseen readjustments in the tariff
structure did not lend to much confidence in the U.S. GSP on the part of
the CARICOM producer. Additionally, the possibility of exclusion of
Venezuela and Ecuador loomed large at one point in time for those
CARICOM states who belonged to producers' organizations.
CECON, the OAS consultative body dealing with US-Latin American
trade, did not prove very effective in a situation where the aims of the two
sides seemed largely opposed. Invoking the CECON policy of consulta-
tion, any sharp new change in trade relations made little difference - for
instance, in the case where the tariff on non-GSP sugar had been tripled.
Additionally, it later became clear that the United States was interested
in a very short list of products which the Latin American countries were
asked to provide with respect to an evaluation for the purpose of GSP
treatment.
Finally, quite different from the Lomo arrangement, the CARICOM
countries discovered that there was no advantage in being a community
and common market with respect to products in which there was more
than one Community country's local input or value-added. While in the
Lom6 Convention inputs made in Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and
Tobago were eligible for consideration as a fixed local value-added
requirement, in the case of the U.S. system, the value-added level required
for duty-free treatment increased from thirty-five to fifty percent
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whenever more than one Community country's inputs were involved.
Added to this was the uncertainty as to how the U.S. Customs would
arrive at a figure of local value. Other minor irritants, such as having to
fumigate certain agricultural produce (however necessary it may be for
U.S. health authorities), only add to the list of problems of the CARICOM
producer aiming at the U.S. market.
CONCLUSION
In traditional problem-solving, once the variants are assured to have
balanced out, an ideal formula for arriving at a solution is composed.
With regard to US-CARICOM trade, the equation seems to be burdened
with imponderable variants. While it must be clear that the deficit carried
by most CARICOM countries in their trade with the United States cannot
stretch into endlessly large figures, and while it must be evident that a
redress in the imbalance could lead to increased trade volumes (including
increased U.S. exports), it is not so clear what mechanisms will
eventually be put into action to rectify the present trend. It will take some
time before it becomes clear, for instance, how effective the efforts being
made by the Barbados government to stimulate exports have been, or
what additional inputs must be made to break into the U.S. market well
in excess of the BDS$52.7 million registered for 1976. Presumably too, the
Puerto Rican rum lobby will not lose its effectiveness overnight, nor the
restrictions apparent in the Trade Act become suddenly more manage-
able. One possibility may perhaps lie in a combination of greater local
investment in CARICOM industry and greater U.S. participation in joint
US-CARICOM involvement in an export trade which is certain to prove a
significant factor in the overall stability of the region.
Parenthetically, ECLA study of Economic Activity in the Caribbean
reveals that prior to 1973, the CARICOM, with the exception of Guyana,
was trading with the United Kingdom along deficit lines. It would
therefore seem that the shift to a deficit trading relationship with the
United States after 1973 was not essentially related to a rise in oil prices
but rather was a simple shift in trade direction. Indeed, Trinidad and
Tobago, which showed an export over import gain in its trade with the
U.S., already had a positive balance of trade with the United States prior
to 1973. 7
What therefore explains the shift in trade, apart from political
developments within the hemisphere, was the plummeting of the pound
sterling to which the old currency of the Eastern Caribbean (the EC
7. Economic Activity-1976 in Caribbean Countries ECLA/CARIB 77/5, Part
IX, p. 25.
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dollar) had been pegged. Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana and then Trinidad
and Tobago eventually found it meaningful to peg their "new" currencies
to what in the mid-seventies was the more stable U.S. dollar. With the
fluctuations of the pound nearly unpredictable, Caribbean businessmen
found it easier to look for their manufactures in the United States.
Thus, perhaps, the most crucial point about the Community's trade is
that it is externally-oriented. The fact that the bulk of that trade is now
with the United States is less significant than that the trade is dependent
as distinct from interdependent. What also becomes apparent is that the
concept of development by stages does not appear valid for these
countries of the American periphery. What remains, therefore, is the
possibility of the ultimate relinquishment of their external relations in
both economic and political areas to promote the achievement of internal
capital accumulation. Perhaps this is the ultimate message to be gained
from the partial refusal of Jamaica and Guyana to accept some of the
products of other CARICOM states despite the existence in the
Community of a free and common market.
